Drawing from the personal tape recordings made during the presidency of Richard Nixon, we uncover and report in this paper new evidence that Nixon manipulated Arthur Burns and the Federal Reserve Bank into creating a political business cycle that helped secure Nixon's reelection victory in 1972. Nixon understood the risks that his desired monetary policy imposed, but chose to trade longer-term economic costs to the economy for his own short-term political benefit.
Introduction.
Over thirty-years ago, William Nordhaus (1975) initiated the literature on the opportunistic political business cycle, the idea that politicians regardless of their party affiliation try to maximize their chances for reelection by creating favorable economic environments in the run-up to elections. If operative, the opportunistic political business cycle should yield economic fluctuations that follow the election cycle. Nordhaus' work has spawned hundreds of papers, but support for his hypothesis has been far from unanimous (see, e.g., Alesina, et al. 1997 ).
Richard Nixon knew well the importance of economic conditions, especially unemployment, in affecting presidential election outcomes and blamed his narrow defeat in the 1960 presidential election on a weak economy. After winning the presidency in 1968, he became dissatisfied with secretarial minute-taking and secretly substituted tape recording devices in the White House. The tapes provide witness to the views and opinions of decision-makers that often conflicted with their public statements. The tapes reveal that Nixon, more than being a "Keynesian," as he once described himself, was a "Monetarist." He was well versed in the then-current monetary policy theory championed by Milton Friedman. He knew monetary policy's short-run effect on interest rates, its impact lag, and its longer-run effect on inflation. He believed firmly that monetary growth rates were crucial for changing aggregate demand and the unemployment rate in the short run. On the other hand, he and his close advisors showed little or no understanding of the effects of inflationary expectations on nominal interest rates and the distinction between real and nominal interest rates. Regardless, over the next several years, he obsessed about money supply growth rates and fought to get monetary policy sufficiently expansionary and nominal interest rates lower in a timely fashion to reduce unemployment prior to the 1972 election.
Since individuals visiting Nixon were unaware that they were being recorded, their views captured by the Nixon tapes are more likely to represent their true positions than their positions exposited in public forums. In this paper, we draw extensively from the Nixon tapes to reveal new evidence of successful presidential interference in monetary policy that produced an opportunistic political business cycle. The tapes reveal new details on how the Fed's independence was threatened and compromised to achieve Nixon's desired monetary policy for short-run political gain.
Monetary Policy 1969-1970.
In presidential-election year 1968, the unemployment rate finished low, but Nixon is clearly frustrated by Burns' independence and indicates he is prepared to "take on" the Fed to get his desired monetary policy. This is the first mention in the Nixon tapes concerning an explicit threat to the independence of the Fed. There will be more.
March 16, 1971.
Nixon and Connally discuss Burns. They discuss the need to rein in Burns and who should do it. Connally says he will talk to Burns and tell him to stay out of Connally's territory. He'll tell Burns:
"If you want to maintain the independence of this Federal Reserve System, you oughtn't to be talking about wage and price policies and fiscal affairs…it's not your business…sure you're knowledgeable about it, but what the hell, you're running the Federal Reserve now." (Conversation 468 -15, March 16, 1971, Nixon and Connally. ) Also in this conversation, Nixon says: "…he is also wrong in terms of monetary supply, damn it! Everybody except Arthur thinks it [the money supply] ought to be higher and let's just keep hitting him on that…..He [Burns] must not do things that are going to embarrass the Administration." (Ibid.) Contrary to Nixon's claim that "everybody" thinks the money supply should be higher, Nixon will hear (reported below) from Milton Friedman that monetary policy is already too expansionary. The embarrassment that Burns might inflict on the Administration is apparently to allow the unemployment rate to remain too high.
March 18, 1971
Connally reports to the President about his meeting with Burns. Connally's message to Burns was that Burns is losing his influence in the Administration. Connally told Burns, "If I read the tea leaves right, that isn't the way things are going. They're going the other way.' I said, 'you're isolating yourself more and more. … Normally the Treasury and Federal Reserve will be right together and that's the way I want it, but if you're going to isolate yourself, I can't go with you." (Conversation 469 -9, March 18, 1971, Nixon and Connally.) Connally and Nixon are letting Burns know that he is rapidly becoming the oddman out due to his opposition to increasing the growth rate of the money supply to stimulate the economy. Burns, by being too independent, is told he is isolating himself.
Burns needs to get onboard with the Treasury (i.e., Connally) or face the consequences.
One of the consequences, never explicitly mentioned, is that Burns' reappointment as Fed chair could be in danger. The position as chair is only for four years and Burns' term as chair would be up in February, 1974. Another consequence, one likely to have been of more importance to Burns, is a challenge to the Fed's independence.
Later that day, Nixon meets with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and praises
Connally: "That's the only man that can stand up to Arthur [Burns] . Nixon (to Burns): "We've really got to think of goosing it … late summer and fall of this year [1971] and next year [1972] . As you know there's a hell of a lag." (Conversation 470 -18, March 19, 1971 , Nixon and Burns.)
March 19, 1971
Nixon and Burns meet. Burns is upset about criticism through press leaks. He emphasizes his loyalty to the President.
Burns: "I'm doing my basic job at the Fed [tape skips] I'm a dedicated man, to serve the health and strength of our national economy, and I've done everything in my power, as I see it to help keep pressing your reputation, your standing in American life and in history. I've never seen a conflict between the two. But I want you to know this, if a conflict did arise, the moment a conflict arises, I'm going to be right here [Burns bangs the table for emphasis]. And I'll tell you about it and we'll talk it out, and try to decide together where to go next." (Conversation 470 -18, March 19, 1971, Nixon and Burns.) Burns is restating his loyalty to Nixon while acknowledging that policy differences exist between them. His tone suggests he might be amenable to compromise on his monetary policy stance. But for now, before "talking it out," he makes another In his conversation with Nixon, Burns raises yet another justification for his resistance to easing monetary policy. He warns that lowering interest rates now would cause rates to increase during the election year, with the implication that the resulting damage to housing will hurt Nixon's reelection chances.
Burns: "If interest rates go down further through my actions…the probability as I see it is, they will go up later on in the year and in 1972. Housing which is recovering very nicely will go into a tailspin in 1972. Where will we be, as a country, and as a party and me personally?" ( Burns: "The lenders, fearing an intensification of the inflation rate are holding out for somewhat higher interest rates, because they'll be paid back in cheaper dollars." 2 (Ibid.)
Burns' view is that inflation is rising and suggests energetic action on the wageprice front (wage and price controls were under consideration by the Administration) and a halt to an expansion in government spending. Nixon also wants another rumor leaked, directly attacking the Fed's independence.
Nixon: "In view of the fact that the President has responsibility for full employment, the President is considering legislation to … the Fed has got to be brought in the …"
Haldeman: "in the executive branch."
Nixon: "The independence of the Fed…"
Haldeman: "is seriously in question."
Nixon: "Connally feels, John and Bob, that it'd be helpful… he thinks it might sort of worry Arthur a little." (Ibid.)
While the Fed has considerable independence, its powers are derived from federal legislation. Laws can be changed and Nixon now spreads rumors that he may do so in a way that would reduce the independence of the Fed.
Nixon and Haldeman continue discussing two pending vacancies on the Federal
Reserve Board. Nixon reiterates his desire to fill the positions with individuals who will support his desire for an easier monetary policy.
Nixon: "We're going to fill 'em both with basically easy money men."
Haldeman: "George (Shultz) said both he and Connally are under orders from you to find the easiest money man in town." (Ibid.)
July 27, 1971. Connally states that he expects another bad day at the gold window and that we are "constantly losing the initiative". The reference is to the gold drain.
3
Nixon is reluctant to suspend dollar convertibility and stalls:
"…if we're going to have to move our timetable up and uh try to explain all this thing you know, that's a hell of a hard thing to explain to people." (Conversation 7 -112, August 12, 1971 , Nixon and Connally.)
August 12, 1971
In spite of Connally's urging to accelerate the program, Nixon expresses his desire to call Congressional leaders back on September 7 and announce the program then.
Later, Connally predicts that closing the gold window will not be the main focus of public attention:
"To the average person in this country this wage and price freeze -to him means you mean business. You're gonna stop this inflation. You're gonna try to get control of this economy. …If you take all of these actions…you're not going to have anybody…left out to be critical of you." (Conversation 273-20, August 12, 1971, Nixon, Connally and Shultz.) 4 A few minutes later Nixon agrees to accelerate the program:
"I think we ought to go Monday [August 16, 1971] with the whole ball." (Ibid.)
August 15, 1971.
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Nixon gives a nationally televised address and announces his New Economic Policy (NEP). NEP's major provisions close the gold window, float the dollar, place a 90-day freeze on wages and prices and impose a ten-percent tariff on imports. "Now on the domestic side, there are two questions or problems. One is the technical problem of how you unwind the price control.
[garbled] But I think there is a more fundamental or basic problem. The great danger lies in the path we are now on, is that, under cover of suppressing the inflation, the true inflationary forces will be increased. That's the real danger. Because the Congressman says, 'Why do we have to worry about inflation? Here's the CLC [Cost of Living Council], they're taking care of it for us.' Now that's a very real danger, because we want to look forward…"
Nixon: "They'll spend more."
Friedman: "They'll spend more. The same danger with the Fed. When it sat down, it could print more. Now from your point of view and our point of view, we want to look forward, not only to '72, but beyond that. We don't want, we all want a victory in '72, but we don't want a victory which has to be followed by a course of action that puts the Democrats in power for 20 years."
Nixon: "Yeah."
Friedman: "[garbled]… If you let the inflationary pressure build up over us, we might be able to hold it down at least through the election [in 1972] .
[Garbled] After this, you'll have a great upsurge in inflation. And there would be again pressure to stepping on the brakes, hard again. We will have thrown away the advantage, what we gained with the cost of the 1970 recession. You'll have to have an even worse recession. And, if in 1974, your fortune is to superintend a severe recession, that's going to put the Democrats back in for 20 years. Now that's a horror story and I don't mean to say it's [garbled]. It's possible. Now the question is how to avoid it. And the key to avoiding it is our friend Arthur [Burns] , as I was telling you last night."
Nixon: "Uh, huh."
Friedman: "Because Congress will not be able to, I think, prevent from spending and we'll have a whopping [garbled] deficit. And if the Fed monetizes that deficit and increases the quantity of money at anything like the way it did in the first six months of this year, I'm afraid that the scenario I've described is inevitable."
Nixon: "Well, let's just hope we don't convince Arthur to do it too soon." (Friedman laughs). (Conversation 578 -4, September 24, 1971, Nixon, Shultz and Friedman.) Nixon is worried that a tight monetary policy applied "too soon" would adversely affect the employment picture prior to the election. In this conversation, Shultz and
Nixon also express concern that the Fed had engaged in monetary "contraction" in the previous month. Friedman asserts what later becomes conventional wisdom that monthto-month money supply numbers are not very meaningful and assures them that a robust economic recovery is underway. Friedman predicts that unemployment will not be a problem for the 1972 election and restates that the real problem is to keep the money supply growth in the 4-5 percent range so that inflationary pressures will not build up.
Friedman's advice falls on deaf ears.
Burns Blinks, November-December, 1971.
Burns abruptly reverses his position on monetary policy and announces to a delighted Nixon two reductions in the discount rate on November 10 and December 10. "Now what about the money supply?"
Shultz: "He [Burns] agrees that the money supply should now go up."
Nixon: "Is he going to do it?" (Conversation 640 -3, December 22, 1971, Nixon and Burns.) Shortly after, Burns enters the room. After exchanging pleasantries, Burns eventually says "I've got Federal Reserve problems" and discusses his disappointment in the new nominee to the Board and details his concern that John Connally's views influenced the decision. Nixon details the decision process, which involved various political considerations (never mentioning the-easiest-money-man criterion, however), and assures Burns that "your views will receive primary weight" and that Nixon would never appoint someone Burns vetoes. Nixon says that as a rule he never considers candidates that an agency or department head vetoes. After the men finish the discussion about the appointment process, the meeting seems to be wrapping up when, 
